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Abstract—In this paper, we present a model based design
approach to the development of a semi-autonomous control
system for an inspection drone. The system is tasked with
maintaining a set distance from the target being inspected and
a constant relative pose, allowing the operator to manoeuvre
the drone around the target with ease. It is essential that the
robustness of the autonomous behaviour be thoroughly verified
prior to actual implementation, as this will involve the flight of
a large multi-rotor drone in close proximity to a solid structure.
By utilising the Robotic Operating System to communicate
between the autonomous controller and the drone, the same
Simulink model can be used for numerical coverage testing,
high fidelity simulation, offboard execution and final executable
deployment.
Index Terms—Model based design, verification, autonomy,
inspection, drone
I. INTRODUCTION
The civilian use of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(SUAS) or drones for removing personnel from hazardous
situations has grown significantly in recent years. One par-
ticular sector which has embraced the technology is that of
structural inspection [1], [2], [3]. Previously, this type of
activity required persons to work on scaffolding or via rope
access, leading to 39 deaths in Great Britain during 2013/14
[4]. Using drones to collect imagery which can then by
analysed by an expert represents a significant improvement
in safety, whilst also reducing the cost of obtaining such
data. This also allows inspections to be conducted on a
more regular-cycle, this allows the condition of structures to
be inspected more frequently, and allow maintenance to be
target to components reaching the end of their life-cycle [5],
for example on power-lines [6].
Despite these benefits, operation of a drone in close
proximity to a structure can be a challenging task due to
complex environmental conditions [7] and potentially poor
situation awareness of the remote pilot [8]. To reduce the
mental workload of the pilot in these situations it is beneficial
to give the vehicle its own, artificial, situation awareness [9].
An inspection drone which is aware of its own proximity
to a structure is able to perform the challenging task of
distance keeping without pilot input. This frees up the pilot
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to concentrate on the task of data collection, ensuring the
correct images are captured, without having to focus on
the safety of the vehicle. Such a semi-autonomous drone
allows inspection tasks to be carried out in more challenging
conditions and at a greater distance from the pilot than is
possible with current systems.
This paper discusses the development of a semi-
autonomous inspection drone capable of maintaining a fixed
distance and relative heading to a structure of interest. A
Model Based Design (MBD) framework is introduced which
enables any candidate control system to be thoroughly tested
numerically and in high fidelity simulation prior to any real
world flights. The focus of this testing is to ensure the real
world flights can be conducted safely in close proximity to
a structure, without undue risk to the vehicle.
The next section introduces the inspection scenario being
considered and Section III details the hardware and software
architecture of the vehicle. Section IV discusses numerical
coverage testing, the first stage in the MBD process. Section
V details the high fidelity simulation testing, with an example
of how this can uncover unsafe controller performance.
Section VI discusses two levels of real world testing, first
executing the control system remotely and second executing
a compiled binary onboard the vehicle. Finally, Section VII
draws some conclusions and outlines further work.
II. SCENARIO
A number of commercial drone operators in the UK
regularly undertake structural inspections with their vehicles.
When flying in close proximity to a structure it is not possible
to rely on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) for
positioning due to its limited accuracy and susceptibility
to occlusion and multipath errors [10]. Additionally, it is
unlikely the vehicle will posses a high fidelity geofence
[11] (corresponding to the physical outline of the structure)
required for a GNSS system to assure adequate separation.
Pilots must instead position the vehicle manually using an
attitude stabilisation mode [12], requiring significant skill.
This piloting method introduces a significant delay be-
tween the vehicle experiencing a disturbance and corrective
action being taken by the pilot. This delay imposes strict
limits on the operating conditions for the vehicle so as to
Fig. 1. Diagrammatic representation of the control task. d is controlled
to a target value by altering the pitch angle of the vehicle. φ is controlled
to zero by altering the yaw rate of the vehicle. The pilot retains control of
throttle and roll angle
maintain safe separation from the structure at all times. The
maximum wind gust which can be tolerated is primarily
determined by the reaction time of the pilot which can
be variable due to the high workload associated with the
task. Additionally, the maximum distance from the pilot the
vehicle can be operated is limited by the pilots ability to
adequately judge the separation distance.
The semi-autonomous controller discussed in this paper is
tasked with significantly reducing pilot workload during an
inspection task by maintaining a fixed distance and relative
heading to the structure at all times. The controller utilises
a LiDAR scanner to detect the structure and takes control of
the vehicles pitch and yaw axes away from the pilot, Fig.
1. Incorporation of such an assistive system may enable the
operational limitations discussed previously to be relaxed,
provided the performance of the system can be verified as
safe.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The drone platform used in this study is an 8kg Octocopter
airframe, equipped with a Pixhawk Flight Control System
(FCS) running the ArduCopter firmware1. The autonomous
control is deployed to an additional onboard computer,
an Odroid XU32, running Linux and the Robot Operating
System (ROS) [13]. Fig 2 illustrates a schematic view of the
onboard systems, with the autonomous controller executing
on the onboard processor. Fig. 3 shows the components on
the actual vehicle.
The Radio Control (RC) input from the human pilot
consists of eight channels corresponding to3
1http://copter.ardupilot.com/wiki/common-pixhawk-
overview/
2http://www.hardkernel.com/main/products/prdt_
info.php?g_code=G140448267127
3Items in italics are not relevant to this discussion
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Fig. 2. Schematic view of the onboard systems architecture of the drone
Fig. 3. Major system components onboard octocopter vehicle
1) Roll angle command
2) Pitch angle command
3) Throttle command
4) Yaw rate command
5) Flight mode
6) Autonomous control enable
7) Auxiliary 1
8) Auxiliary 2
Under manual control, the ArduCopter firmware uses the
first four of these channels as commands for its attitude
stabilisation system. The autonomous controller is developed
in Simulink and utilises the Robotics System Toolbox to
communicate with the autopilot via a combination of Univer-
sal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) connection
Fig. 4. Logical assertions ensuring controller only enabled when requested
and able
and mavros4 interface. When RC channel 6 indicates that
autonomous control should be enabled, the controller then
overrides RC input channels 2 and 4 with its control signals.
Due to the safety critical nature of the autonomous con-
troller it is not desirable to progress straight to real world
testing, as a failure of the system could quickly destroy
the vehicle. Instead, a MBD approach is used to assure
the performance of the system within a software based test
environment. The following sections detail the increasing
level of fidelity of test environments, up to a deployed
executable running onboard the drone.
IV. COVERAGE TESTING
Preliminary testing is focused on the discrete logic of the
controller, ensuring that the control system is only active
when requested and when it is receiving data of sufficient
quality. The following assertions are included in the model
• Controller only enabled when RC channel 6 is high (>
1500)
• Controller only enabled when structure is in range
(LiDAR distance is not infinite)
• Controller only enabled when LiDAR distance is valid
• Controller only enabled when LiDAR heading is valid
These assertions can be seen within the Simulink model
in Fig. 4.
The model is executed within a test harness which gener-
ates feasible, but otherwise random, input signals to replace
those normally received from the LiDAR and FCS. These
random signals are fed to the model, which is running as a
desktop simulation, via a locally executed ROS environment.
The use of ROS in this way means there are no modifications
required to the model to run in this coverage test compared
with running fully deployed on the real vehicle.
Should any of the above assertion fail during the test, the
model will be terminated allowing the designer to inspect
the inputs which lead to the failure and modify the system
appropriately.
4http://wiki.ros.org/mavros
Fig. 5. Discrete decision coverage during testing
Fig. 6. AR.Drone 2.0 equipped with a laser scanner hovering near a wall
in the gazebo simulator.
During coverage testing it is desirable to ensure that all
possible discrete states of the model have been explored. For
complex models this may not always be possible, but for this
relatively simple example 100% coverage was achieved, as
confirmed by a Simulink coverage report, Fig. 5. None of
the assertions failed during this test, therefore it is safe to
move on to a higher testing fidelity.
V. SIMULATION-BASED TESTING
Once the logical performance of the controller has been
assured by coverage testing, an analysis of its physical per-
formance is required. To facilitate this testing, an appropriate
model of a multirotor has been selected, using the Technical
University of Munich Simulator package [14]. A simulated
AR.Drone 2.0 equipped with a laser scanner is shown in
Fig. 6 hovering near a structure. This provides an adequate
software in the loop simulator to begin the exploration of
controllers before they can be deployed on real platforms.
When assessing the physical performance of a control
system, many possible time response criteria may be used,
such as rise time and overshoot [15]. In order to perform
Fig. 7. Safety performance assertion ensuring separation to structure
such analysis, however, the system model must match the
real system very closely. Due to the difficulties in accurately
modelling the flight of a multirotor close to a structure, such
as rotor wake interactions [16], [17], this approach was not
suitable. Instead, a high level, safety based, performance as-
sessment was conducted to determine whether the controller
was safe to deploy to the real vehicle. The criteria for this
assessment was captured in an additional runtime assertion
• Multirotor remains > 2m from structure at all times
This assertion can be seen in Simulink in Fig. 7, utilising
the ground truth position information available from the
simulation environment.
During this test, the simulation environment was used to
produce the ROS signals to fed the controller, once again
requiring no modification from the final code. Fig. 8 shows
the layout of the ROS Graph for the simulated AR.DRone
2.0 in Gazebo. The simulated quadrotor uses a standard setup
which is platform agnostic, this means that the same con-
trollers can be quickly ported to real aircraft once behaviour
has been verified in simulation. The “octo1” and “Inspec-
tionControl” nodes are launched from within Simulink. A
bespoke “FlyOnMavRos” node translates the standard RC
controls to Twist commands within ROS, this can then be
passed onto the AR.Drone 2.0 and flown in exactly the
same manner as a physical platform. In order to maintain
complete transparency between simulation and real-world
the “FlyOnMavRos” node echoes back the commands it is
sending to the AR.Drone 2.0 via a standard MavRos topic
“/octo1/mavros/rc/in”, with appropriate offsets to provide all
information that would be available on the real platform.
Fig. 9 illustrates the results of a drone tasked with per-
forming an exterior inspection task in simulation. It can be
seen that at no time does the drone enter the safety zone,
therefore the safety assertion never fails.
Fig. 10 illustrates the done conducting an interior inspec-
tion task. In this situation it can be seen that the drone
does infringe the safety zone, triggering the assertion and
terminating the simulation. The cause of this failure can be
determined by inspecting the sensor system details in Fig. 1,
which shows the LiDAR region of interest to be located in
front of the drone, facing towards the object being inspected.
Whilst traversing and inspecting the lower wall in Fig. 10,
the drone is not actively sensing in its direction of movement,
leading to the possibility of collision with the leftmost wall.
The failure of the control system in this situation illustrates
the utility of conducting this degree of simulation testing
prior to real world deployment. Identifying this failure mode
of the system during real world testing would likely result
Fig. 8. ROS Graph showing node layout and topic connection for simulated
scanning in the gazebo simulator.
-5 0 5 10
X position [m]
-5
0
5
Y 
po
sit
io
n 
[m
]
Simulation of an exterior structural inspection task
Start position
Vehicle path
Safety Zone
Structure
Fig. 9. Simulation of drone performing an exterior inspection task without
infringing the safety zone
in a collision between the drone and a structure, causing
significant damage to both and delaying further development.
Finding such a failure in simulation, however, is a relatively
quick process and the system can then either be redesigned
to cope with this condition, or operational limitations placed
on it to prevent this condition being encountered.
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Fig. 10. Simulation of drone performing an interior inspection task and
infringing the safety zone
Fig. 11. 8kg Octocopter performing semi-autonomous indoor inspection
task
VI. REAL WORLD TESTING
A. Preliminary offboard testing
Once simulation based verification has been completed,
fully defining the safe operating conditions for the system,
it can be progressed to real world testing. By utilising the
distributed nature of ROS, it is possible to first execute
system on a ground based computer, transferring data to
and from the drone via the wireless bridge shown in Fig. 2.
Executing the system in this way allows for straight forward
monitoring and parameter tuning at runtime, providing an
increased level of confidence in system performance and
shorter development times.
The only modification made to the system to support real
world testing is to disable model termination on the failure
of an assertion, in favour of a runtime warning. This ensures
the pilot is always able to disable the RC override before
terminating the model. The separation assertion discussed
in the previous section is left in the model to minimise
the modifications needed, however it is not active because
no ground truth measurement is available during real world
testing.
Fig. 11 illustrates the aircraft detailed in Section III
conducting preliminary flight trials. By operating within the
safety limitations identified during simulation based testing,
the distance and heading controllers can now be tuned to
achieve the desired time response performance.
B. Deployment in ROS
After tuning the control systems with the model executing
on an offboard computer, the final step is to deploy it as
an executable running on the vehicles onboard computer. In
previous Simulink versions this was a time consuming pro-
cess, often requiring custom C code to be written to interface
with hardware peripherals. The Robotics System Toolbox
streamlines this entire process by using a conventional ROS
build environment on the target computer to compile the
model.
Once deployed as an executable, the final testing of the
system can be conducted to ensure that the desired perfor-
mance achieved during offboard testing is still achieved. By
completing the various stages of simulation testing prior to
deployment, there are no possible cases in which the control
system can fail to operate safely.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has introduced a MBD framework for the
development of a semi-autonomous control system for a
structural inspection drone. The primary aim of this approach
was to verify that the control system would perform safely
during real world testing, by providing as much assurance
as possible in simulation. The utility of MBD has been
illustrated by its ability to detect a fundamental design flaw
which (if encountered during real world testing) could have
significantly damaged the vehicle. Work is ongoing to tune
the real world control system within the bounds identified in
simulation.
Further development of the control system discussed in
this paper, to include higher degrees of autonomy, will place
a greater burden on MBD testing. For example, for a complex
decision making system it may not be possible to achieve
100% decision coverage during early testing. Additionally,
application of MBD to autonomous drones conducting more
complex tasks than simple structural inspection will require
a significantly larger suite of simulation based test environ-
ments. Further work is needed to develop this framework
to support the safety verification of these more complex
systems.
It was noted in this paper that time response performance
could not be adequately assessed during simulation due to
the complexities of modelling multirotor vehicles in close
proximity to structures. As drones are increasingly developed
to operate in these environments it may become desirable
to conduct more significant controller tuning in simulation
as this provides a faster turnaround time than real world
testing. Further work is required in the area of modelling
and simulation of rotorcraft in close proximity to structures
in order to support this development.
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